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Abstract: The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London, has spurred national debate, as many people portray the court’s 
decision as a damaging blow to private property rights.  In Kelo, the court 
confirmed local government’s ability to condemn property in an area designated 
as blighted by the state, in order to encourage economic development.  This 
article highlights several positive examples of this sort of condemnation in New 
York case law, where the public interest was served by economic 
redevelopment.  The article goes further, to distinguish several legal decisions 
from Kelo, where courts invalidated condemnations upon a finding that the 




In Kelo v. City of New London, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the long-
standing principle that governments can condemn private land in order to carry 
out area-wide redevelopment projects. No. 04-108, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5011 (June 
23, 2005).   The decision, which affirms the legal status quo, has been spun as a 
grievous invasion of property rights that now threatens every American home. 
Kelo would warrant the public attention it is getting if it had gone the other way, if 
one more justice had sided with the dissent. The Kelo facts involve the taking of 
private land in a designated redevelopment area in a state designated distressed 
city.  It is the prior law and the Court’s holding in this limited context that is the 
subject of this column. 
 
In most states, including New York, had the Court gone the other way, the 
decision would have muddied clear and long-settled state court precedents; used 
federal courts to dictate state-defined property rights and public interests; cast a 
shadow over a procedure that has led to the revival of distressed downtowns, 
urban neighborhoods, and waterfronts throughout the country; limited one of the 
few fiscal remedies available to economically distressed cities; and strapped their 
ability to redevelop dangerous brownfields located in poor neighborhoods – a 
matter of environmental justice.   
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The Legal Question 
 
In Kelo, the question was whether the taking by condemnation of title to 
unblighted single-family homes for the purpose of transferring ownership to a 
private developer to accomplish a large-scale waterfront redevelopment project 
constituted a public use under the Fifth Amendment.  The terms of the 
Amendment allow such takings, but only if they accomplish a public use and 
require the payment of just compensation to the condemnees.  At issue is the 
critical matter of whether distressed cities, like New London, when specifically 
authorized by state legislation, can carry out programs to increase jobs, 
strengthen their tax bases, revitalize neighborhoods, and stabilize property 
values by condemning the land of private property owners who are not willing to 
sell to the government at a negotiated price.   
 
Public sympathies for Ms. Kelo and her fellow petitioners run high. Their homes 
are not blighted, two or three of them have lived in the neighborhood for 
decades, and their futures are clouded by having to use the compensation they 
will receive to relocate and build new lives among new neighbors.  On the other 
side is the stark reality of life in New London and other cities throughout the 
country that are struggling to revitalize themselves so that they can provide 
public services and a decent quality of life for the disproportionately high 
percentage of homeless, jobless, and income-strapped citizens they shelter.  
 
New York Law 
 
In an amici curiae brief filed in Kelo, the Empire State Development Corporation 
noted its success in transforming neighborhoods surrounding the New York 
Stock Exchange, Seven World Trade Center, and in the 42nd Street 
Redevelopment Area, using authority to condemn private properties and convey 
them to private development companies under the strict procedures established 
in statutes adopted by the New York State legislature. Its brief notes that “despite 
private benefits, the predominant economic and social benefits have accrued to 
the public.” 
 
In Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. The New York State Urban Development 
Corporation, 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit affirmed a District 
Court decision upholding the taking of the petitioners’ unblighted buildings which 
were needed for the 42nd Street Redevelopment Project.  The District Court 
found that the proposed taking was rationally related to a conceivable public 
purpose.  The Second Circuit noted that “the power of eminent domain is a 
fundamental and necessary attribute of sovereignty, superior to all private 
property rights.”  It rested its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision the 
previous year in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), 
concluding that “courts long have recognized that the compensated taking of 
private property for urban renewal or community redevelopment is not proscribed 
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by the Constitution.”  The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rosenthal in 1986.  
475 U.S. 1018 (1986). 
 
We heard from the Court of Appeals on the subject in 1986 in a unanimous 
opinion written by Judge Kaye in a case that also challenged the Urban 
Development Corporation’s (UDC) condemnations in the 42nd Street 
Redevelopment Project area. Jackson v. New York State Urban Development 
Corporation, 494 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1986).  The court noted that, as required by 
the state Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL), the UDC had made a 
reasoned determination that the condemnation would serve a valid public 
purpose and that the scope of the court’s review under the statute is narrow. The 
EDPL is representative of statutes in a number of states that guide and limit the 
power of government to exercise the power of eminent domain. Under this 
statute the condemning authority must provide public notice, hold a public 
hearing, specify the public use, benefit, and purpose of the project.  The court 
cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Hawaii Housing Authority for the 
proposition that the due process requirements of the Constitution are satisfied 
where there is a rational relationship to a conceivable public purpose.   
 
Various industrial companies, including several oil refineries, challenged the City 
of Syracuse Industrial Development Agency for condemning their properties to 
further a waterfront redevelopment master plan for an 800 acre area on the south 
shore of Onondaga Lake known as “oil city.” Sun Company, Inc. v. City of 
Syracuse IDA, 625 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).  The area was located 
next to several low-income neighborhoods in Syracuse where a 
disproportionately large percentage of welfare recipients, jobless, and poverty 
level households resided. This is a classic environmental justice context.  The 
court followed the tests outlined in Jackson and found that the purpose of the 
taking was to accomplish a proper use and that this determination was not 
without a proper foundation.  The petitioners’ motion for leave to appeal was 
denied by the Court of Appeals in 1997.  679 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1997).  
 
The Kelo Decision 
 
The majority in the Kelo case, a 5-4 decision written by Justice Stevens, held that 
the purpose for the taking was a legitimate public use, clearing the way for the 
New London Development Corporation to condemn title from nine individual 
owners who held onto 15 parcels of the 115 private lots in the redevelopment 
area.  Justice Stevens noted: “For more than a century, our public use 
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor 
of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify 
the use of the takings power.” 
 
The dissenting opinion, drafted by Justice O’Connor, agreed with the petitioners 
who argued that the Court should establish a new “heightened scrutiny” test for 
takings designed to accomplish economic development purposes.  Such takings 
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could be classified as invalid per se, presumptively invalid, or invalid if the 
condemning authority could not prove with reasonable certainty that significant 
public benefits will be accomplished. Interestingly, O’Connor’s impassioned 
dissent argues against the approach she adopted a few weeks earlier in the 
landmark decision Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., No. 04-163, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 
4342 (May 23, 2005).   That decision, which she authored, changed the rules for 
determining whether governmental regulations constitute a taking of property 
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Lingle repealed a 25 year-old 
standard that invalidated a government regulation as a taking if it fails to 
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose. In Lingle, Justice O’Connor 
eliminated the test because it requires “courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast 
array of state and federal regulations -- a task for which courts are not well 
suited.  Moreover, it would empower -- and often require -- the courts to 
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert 
agencies.”  This aligns squarely with the rationale of Midkiff in which the Court 
noted that “empirical debates over the wisdom of takings – no less than debates 
over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation – are not to be 
carried out in the federal courts.”   
 
Under existing case law, the Court defers to public use determinations of 
condemning authorities, regardless of the context. If New London had decided 
that Ms. Kelo’s parcel were needed for a public road or to be conveyed to a utility 
company for telephone, transportation, or gas line conveyance, both the majority 
and dissenting justices would defer to the determination that the purpose for 
which the land was taken was a public one, within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment.  The dissenters, however, believe that when the purpose is to 
further the economic objectives of the community, a stricter test should be used.   
 
The cases cited by the majority involved the validation of takings of private 
property in order to advance economic development, such as accomplishing the 
revival of a blighted urban neighborhood in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 
(1954), and eliminating the social and economic evils of a land oligopoly by 
requiring land transfers from lessors to lessess in Hawaii Housing Authority. 
 
In these cases, compensation was paid and the court deferred to the 
government’s public use determination. The majority noted that in Berman, taking 
a nonblighted department store to effect area wide redevelopment of a blighted 
area was within the scope of the police power.  The Berman Court noted that “the 
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. … The values it represents 
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the 
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as 
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully 
patrolled.” 
 
The minority, apparently content with deference in these prior economic 
development cases, distinguished them from Kelo in that the condemned 
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property in Berman and Midkiff  “inflicted affirmative harm on society” and the 
taking, therefore, was necessary to “eliminate the existing property use to 
remedy the harm.”   Dismissing the broad description of the police power in 
Berman as “errant language,” the dissent approached Kelo as if it were a case of 
first impression. It would limit deference to cases where the condemned property 
had “veered to such an extreme that the public was suffering as a consequence,” 
thinking, apparently, that the unblighted parcels of Kelo and her fellow petitioners 
were not harmful to the area redevelopment plan in the same way that the 
petitioner’s unblighted department store in the District of Columbia was harmful 
to the area redevelopment plan in Berman. In both cases, however, the 
acquisition of all parcels in the redevelopment area was essential to the projects’  
success. 
 
The city council in New London, a legislative body, determined – in effect – that 
the petitioners’ properties, in fact, were “harmful” to the interest of its citizens. 
Recall that it was operating under authority of a state statute aimed at promoting 
economic redevelopment in distressed cities and that New London was 
designated a distressed city by the state.  The city council and the state 
legislature understood the context of the system of public finance where the real 
property tax is the balancing factor in the creation of the municipal budget.  The 
median household income of New London’s residents is 40% less than the state 
median; its poverty rate is twice that of the state’s; and its unemployment rate 
30% higher than the rest of the state.   
 
When the city’s redevelopment plan for its waterfront was initiated – with its 
promise of hundreds of new jobs and greatly enhanced property taxes – the city’s 
population had been shrinking and it had just lost a major employer.  Under our 
system of government, its options were limited; the constraints on its ability to 
increase municipal revenue seriously affected its ability, like that of most 
distressed cities, to meet the pressing needs of its poor and moderate income 
neighborhoods and households. The City needed all the parcels in the area to 
carry out an area-wide plan.  Not securing them, therefore, would be harmful to 
the city and its residents.  
 
The Parade of Horribles 
 
The petitioners were represented by an advocacy litigation group that raised 
public awareness of the fact that some public takings are abusive.  The specter 
of corrupt, or misguided, local officials condemning title to property of private 
property owners primarily to benefit private developers was on the mind of the 
minority.  In response, the majority made it clear that “[s]uch a one-to-one 
transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development 
plan, is not presented in this case.”  Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, reminded 
the minority that under the rational basis test, giving due deference to the public 
use determination, the Court can invalidate a condemnation by finding, in a 
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particular case, that the public benefits achieved by such a suspicious transfer 
are only incidental to the benefits that will be conferred on the private parties.   
 
The dissent disparages Kennedy’s confidence in the rational-basis test as 
sufficient to ferret out privately motivated takings, by applying the “stupid staffer” 
test: suggesting that only the most inept administrations could fail to paper over a 
private deal and make it appear public in nature.  The dissent is apparently 
unaware of numerous cases called to the Court’s attention in amici briefs 
submitted in Kelo.  In 99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 
for example, a federal district court in California invalidated the condemnation of 
a store to accommodate the interest of an adjacent Costco’s expansion plans; it 
found that the redevelopment agency’s only purpose “was to satisfy the private 
expansion demands of Costco.”  237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal 2001).  In 
Bailey v. Meyers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. 2003), the state court held that the taking of 
a brake shop for a hardware store to advance economic development lacked the 
requisite public purpose. Donald Trump’s attempt to get the Casino 
Reinvestment Development Authority in New Jersey to condemn the parcels of a 
few landowners who had refused to sell to expand his hotel and casino was 
thwarted by the state court; it found that the Authority had given Trump a blank 
check regarding future development on the site.  Casino Reinvestment 
Development Authority v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Sup. Ct.1998).  
 
Under state law, in fact, courts have invalidated condemnations in Arizona, 
California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and 
Virginia.  In all these cases, there was no sustaining public presence of the type 
involved in all redevelopment projects.  In cases involving no more than a one-to-
one transfer of title between businesses, as a de facto matter, the court’s 
suspicion is aroused and, under the rational-basis test, it senses a lack of public 
involvement and purpose. This enables state courts to invalidate such 
condemnations, saving the homes of average Americans and the businesses of 
moms and pops, dulling the edge of the hard cutting rhetoric of those alarmed by 
the majority’s decision in Kelo.    
 
Kennedy’s caveat regarding how the rational basis test can be used to invalidate 
one-to-one transfers is a strong cautionary message to condemning authorities.  
Reading the 5-4 decision as a reminder to act reasonably, legislatures should, as 
most do, justify the use of condemnation as a necessary means of achieving 
clearly stated public goals in redevelopment projects. Where there is little public 
presence in the development and imprecise means of securing the intended 
public benefits, there is less evident rationality and more vulnerability to 
invalidation.  
 
There is a further response to the alarmists. Redevelopment projects don’t 
gestate in back rooms with greedy politicians waiting as midwives to the birth of 
private wealth. They are subject to onerous, transparent, and lengthy processes 
that provide all the details of the project and invite public participation and 
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extensive debate.  In New London, the public was asked what it thought about 
the redevelopment project as the project was debated, shaped, and decided over 
twenty months – nearly two years. In New York, under the State Environmental 
Quality Review Act, redevelopment projects generate foot-high environmental 
impact statements that include a hard look at their impact on community 
character and neighborhood change and contain lengthy chapters on all the 
economic and environmental consequences of the project.  
 
Public hearings, ULURP proceedings in New York City, reviews of impact 
statements, open meeting laws, conflict of interest rules, and a host of other legal 
protections ensure that the public knows who is involved, how they were chosen, 
what the proposed benefits are, and who will suffer. When such projects are 
approved, this public process has mediated the claims of those affected such as 
Ms. Kelo and her neighbors and the evidence that the greater public will be 
benefited by jobs, public revenues, and property improvement.  
 
 
 
 
